How the USA Can Make the Best of a Bad Situation in Iraq

Eric Davis is a professor of political science and a member of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University ...

He is the author of "Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq."

He makes the point that, justified or not, American forces --- and a few from its allies --- are now ensconced in Iraq. A stark withdrawal is not a practical option, for a multitude of reasons. Here is his suggested course of action:

The continued violence and loss of American lives in Iraq make it understandable why much of the American public has lost confidence in efforts to create a democracy there. It also explains increasing support for the withdrawal of US forces from the country. But consider what is at stake in Iraq. Possessing the world's second-largest oil reserves, Iraq is a potential leader of the Arab world, being the only Arab country with oil, water and extensive human capital in the form of a highly educated middle class. A failure to create a functioning democracy there, allowing Iraq to spiral down into chaos and anarchy, would have disastrous consequences not just for its people but for the entire Middle East and American national interests in the region. Iraq's collapse would lead to more violence and instability in the neighborhood.

What are US policy options in Iraq? There are basically three policies that the US can pursue: the immediate or phased withdrawal of its troops; dividing Iraq into three statelets - representing the three main ethnic groups, the Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds; or remaining in Iraq until its democratically elected government and society can be stabilized.

What would be the consequences of the immediate or phased withdrawal of US troops? One likely possibility is the seizure of power by a coalition of ex-Baathists and radical Sunni Islamists. Because this coalition would face strong opposition, particularly from the Shiites and Kurdish communities, Iraq would remain highly unstable. If, on the other hand, Shiite militias took power, we would see a rise in Sunni insurgent activity. A seizure of power by radicals in Iraq would also embolden radicals in surrounding countries, including such US allies as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Arab Gulf oil producing states. Extensive instability in Iraq's center and south might lead the Kurds to declare independence, which could prompt Turkey to intervene in the Kurdish north. In short, a reduction in US forces is not in Iraq's or American interests.

Another option purporting to offer an end to the violence is dividing Iraq along ethnic lines into three separate states. This idea is a non-starter. First, as public opinion polls have made clear, Iraqis do not want their country divided along such lines. Second, separating Iraq's ethnic groups, who live in mixed areas throughout the country and who are often intermarried, is logistically impossible, or would be accompanied by great violence. Third, were the country to be divided into statelets, the probability is that the violence would increase, not decrease.

For example, two Shiite militias already at loggerheads, the Mehdi Army and the Badr Organization, would intensify efforts to control the new Shiite region. Given the reality of a weak or nonexistent Iraqi national army, there would be no outside force to quell the fighting. One could expect a similar rise in violence in the Sunni statelet as well, between ex-Baathists and Islamist radicals and tribal groups that oppose them.

And fourth, increased instability in the Shiite and Sunni statelets would invite further intervention by outside powers, especially Iran. Equally important, the attempt to divide Iraq would bolster the suspicions of the "Arab street," the large stratum of unemployed and discontented young people throughout the Middle East, who argue that there is a "US-Zionist imperialist" conspiracy to break up the Arab and Muslim world into smaller political units so as to better control it.

A third option is to strengthen Iraqi democracy by initiating policies that would lead to greater stability, offer Iraqis more hope in their future, and create an environment supportive of economic growth. Iraq does not have a history of sectarianism. The Iraqi nationalist movement, which flourished between 1920 and 1963, when the first Baathist regime seized power and repressed it, emphasized cross-ethnic cooperation and promoted building a civil society.

Iraq also has no tradition of Islamic radicalism. It was only after the collapse of Iraq's welfare state following the 1991 Gulf war that Islamist organizations began to offer services no longer provided by the state. With severe economic decline caused by United Nations sanctions after the war, and the spread of corruption and increased repression by Saddam Hussein's regime, many Iraqis began to turn inward to religion and ethnic identities to escape the horrors of everyday life. In other words, the rise of sectarianism was caused by economic and political decay.

Since the fall of the Baath regime in 2003, there has been little job creation for young Iraqis. Most Iraqis in their 30s, 40s or older retained their employment, and some have seen considerable wage increases over the past four years. Because 65 percent of Iraq's population is under 25, stagnation in the job market has disproportionately affected the young - one of the main sources of recruits for Sunni insurgent organizations and Shiite death squads. Large numbers of rural migrants, responding to the continued decline of Iraq's agricultural sector, have also provided recruits for organizations promoting political violence in Iraq's urban areas.

A weak Iraqi economy, which is estimated to have an unemployment rate of between 50 and 60 percent, has spawned another development, namely crime syndicates. Kidnapping, for example, has become a large industry in post-Baath Iraq.

When the US faced severe economic crisis and political instability during the Great Depression of the 1930s, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wisely initiated the so-called New Deal, in which the government took an active role in putting Americans back to work. Iraqis frequently tell me that an improvement in the economic situation would lead to a considerable decline in violence and crime. Thus an important way in which the US could promote democracy would be to establish a reconstruction fund for that very purpose. But how might such a fund work?

With the US already contributing a significant amount of money to Iraq, and facing a large budget deficit, one idea would be for the Bush administration to lobby its Arab oil-producing allies, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, who have all benefited from the recent steep increases in the price of oil. They would be asked to make major contributions to such a reconstruction fund, which would have an "Arab face," thereby shielding it from accusations that the US is trying to control Iraq economically. This would make it politically more acceptable in Iraq.

Why would the Gulf Arab oil producers be interested in contributing to such a fund? First, a more deeply anarchic Iraq would constitute a threat to Saudi Arabia and the entire Gulf region by encouraging radicals in these countries. Saudi Arabia already faces a terrorist threat of its own. Second, an unstable Iraq would allow Iran to exploit this instability and extend its influence in Iraq.

It might be argued that Sunni governments would be hesitant to support the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad due to suspicions that it is sympathetic to Shiite Iran. However, Iraq's Shiites are, in fact, as suspicious of Iranian intentions in their country as are their Arab neighbors to the south. Let us not forget that Iraq's infantry, 90 percent of which was Shiite, fought tenaciously against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. In short, Iraq's Shiite are Iraqis first and Shiite second.

If the US and other Arab allies could convince wealthy Arab oil producers to contribute to a fund, how might this help put Iraq on the road to stability and democracy? Initially, the money could be used to create public-works jobs reminiscent of the New Deal. Such jobs would replicate the Commanders' Emergency Response Program that the US military has used so successfully to quell political violence in Iraq. CERP funds have created temporary jobs for men in areas where there are high levels of insurgent activity. This has led to a sharp decline in violence, gratitude on the part of those Iraqis put to work, and benefits to the local community, such as the removal of garbage and sewage, filling potholes and paving roads, repairing schools and police stations, rebuilding sewage systems, drilling water wells, clearing irrigation canals and building clinics.

Once violence begins to decline following the implementation of a public-works program of job creation, the economic reconstruction fund could organize a second phase in which small economic projects would be promoted to provide sustainable employment. Opening and operating bakeries, schools, new markets, hospitals, as well as other construction work represent the types of activity that could immediately put large numbers of Iraqis into sustainable jobs. This would both pump money into the economy and add to Iraq's social capital.

One of the most significant benefits of this two-stage program would be the development of a new incentive structure with which to entice local leaders in Iraq's major cities and towns to compete for the distribution of economic largesse rather than engage in political violence. Providing economic resources in kind (not in cash, which could be used to purchase weapons) would help bring local leaders and notables into the economic reconstruction projects. In return for their assistance in promoting economic stability, these leaders would receive a wide variety of goods and services, which they could use to enhance their status in their communities. A new school, new medical technology for a local hospital, expanded orphanages, public parks, are all projects that local leaders could point to as bringing benefits to their communities.

The advantage of increased employment and economic growth would give Iraqis greater hope for the future. It would also lower hostility to the Iraqi government and American forces in Iraq. A decline in violence would lead to a decrease in the loss of Iraqi and American lives. A prosperous and democratic Iraq could become a model for the Middle East, whose silent majority desperately wants to substitute greater political freedom and economic prosperity for religious radicalism and authoritarian rule.

Americans are right to be dissatisfied with the continued loss of American lives in Iraq and the tremendous burden Iraq places on the US economy. The daily suffering endured by Iraqis is no less acceptable. By pressing forward with a serious economic reconstruction program in cooperation with its Arab allies, the US would offer hope for a more rapid transition to a democratic Iraq, increased political stability in the Middle East, as well as a homecoming for American troops.