DXRegulation

Two e-currency services based in Texas have been suspended recently ...

INT Gold was raided by the FBI over allegations of missing depositors' funds. EMO ('Electronic Money Orders') had their assets seized by the state authorities for roughly the same thing. It seems both operations were functioning without affording proper attention to their appropriate regulatory bodies. In Texas, for example, they needed a 'money services license' granted by the state. I'm not sure about INT Gold, which held deposits in bullion form, but EMO clearly didn't.

If an e-currency service is going to succeed, it needs the public's trust. The key to doing so is to become incorporated into an acceptable and verifiable means of regulation.

This point seems to be well understood by the most thorough e-currency accounting system, DXinOne, which is featured on the Opportunity page at the Longer Life website. Their approach regarding the regulation to which I'm referring is solely that of their setting parameters for the franchisees. The regulation of DXiO is already in place.

I'm accustomed to offshore operations. As such, I'm comfortable with the DXiO proprietors' --- Global Digital Transfers Inc ('GDT') --- filings and sanctions. They are subject to the laws of Vanuatu, and as they allow dollar-based transactions in their jurisdiction, they have a measure of legal accountability to the American government (among others) as to the legitimacy of entities and operations they license. That is evident in abundance, from extradition treaties to correspondent banking agreements and the internal account monitoring inherent therein.

I'm impressed with the DXiO model. It is an idea whose time --- if it isn't now --- will soon be at hand. I'm not particularly concerned whether or not it succeeds under the stewardship of GDT. Should they falter (which I doubt, incidentally), there will be another solid entity or syndicate to pick up the gauntlet and continue the DXiO operations. Why? Because there is intrinsic value in the proprietary cyber-accounting system they have created and deployed. I don't know if you've checked the markets for operative cyber-products lately, but there is a veritable plethora of funds available from a number of sources who are aggressively looking to acquire the type of system that GDT possesses.

So, from my perspective, the long-term prospects of DXiO are sound.

The beta-test phase of their development has been interesting. One of my earliest postings here made note of their egalitarian format. It's a noble ideal, but virtually every flaw encountered has seemingly been due to that ideal. GDT's low-balling of its communications budget --- they need to hire proficient wordsmiths, among other things --- didn't help the matter, but having said that, a look into their five-year body of work would have given ample indications as to their long-term objectives. That it has survived the beta foibles almost completely intact is noteworthy.

Correspondingly, the prudent manner of franchisee operation has always been there, as well. I noted in a posting a few months ago that a review of their first year's screenshots made very clear the 'credit and storage system' format of the DXiO portfolio facility. Thus, the very nature of rational credit management was quickly established by GDT as a key factor in portfolio husbandry. All anyone had to do was take heed, note the hybrid variables of stock margin fundamentals which have been included in their formula and then comply.

Now, there is consternation from those who have been operating as DXMerchants, handling the exchanging of funds into and out of the DXiO system, about a $950 fee being implemented to maintain a form of DXiO franchise. I do not understand that reaction. Let's set aside, for the moment, the inference that anyone who has been active in the DXiO system for over a year and who has entertained long-term visions of involvement has had ample opportunity to draw an inference that the 'storage' portion of the program was most likely there to accrue resources for the purpose of eventually absorbing increased operations costs. Instead, let's focus on two objectives that such a requirement addresses:

1. Each franchisee will come under the authority of a bona fidé government, encompassing its legal adherence to international standards and its accompanying rules of conduct; and so,

2. Each franchisee will be more attuned to a higher level of accountability within the DXiO system.

In colloquial terms, this will be the start of separating the players from the pretenders. The beta phase has never been about lighting cigars, it's been about seizing opportunity while a system was being refined. Those few who have done so will likely benefit when the bigger investors and clients finally enter the scene. As I also noted in another posting months ago, that will be a time when any sentimentality DXiO had for their beta participants will be well and truly a thing of the past.

If there is any doubt that such investors and clients are on the horizon, all one needs to do is consider the costs involved in DXCafé and LDX franchises and then take note of the announcement that their rollout is imminent.

In summary, the issue of legitimacy has never been about GDT or DXiO. The signs have been there all along as to where the system was going. The opportunity to be well-placed for that occasion has had, to date, a five-year term. The remaining key issue has been, and still is, implementing accountability of the franchisees. The real world will want a timely service package from reliable providers and they will demand recourse in the event of discrepancy. It isn't just GDT that realizes this; we all surely do.

None of us should be fazed, then, that such accountability will be manifest in franchisee regulation.

More to the point, none of us should be in any doubt as to where the true scrutiny is directed.